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UNOFFICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: 
A PROPOSAL FOR THE PERMANENT WOMEN’S TRIBUNAL ON SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE IN ARMED CONFLICT 
 
Abstract 
 
 The ongoing sexual violation of women during recent conflicts stands in sharp contrast to 
increasing recognition that rape, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual violence in armed 
conflict violate international law.  This paper argues that State-based fora cannot adequately hold 
individual perpetrators and State sponsors of such violence accountable.  Accordingly, it posits 
that “unofficial” mechanisms---created by private individuals without authorization from any 
State---be considered as means to eliminate impunity for sexual violence committed during 
armed conflict.  To that end, it evaluates the “people’s tribunal” format, in which proceedings 
similar to a judicial trial are organized and carried out by private individuals.  The paper traces 
the historical development of people’s tribunals, focusing on their use by the international 
women’s movement.  A close analysis of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on 
Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery during WWII illustrates the potential effectiveness of the format 
for addressing sexual violence against women during armed conflict.  Based on this example, the 
paper argues that a people’s tribunal could serve not simply as a last resort for victims denied 
justice in other fora, but rather as a lasting compliment to established international legal 
institutions.  Accordingly, the paper concludes by proposing the creation of a Permanent 
Women’s Tribunal for Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict and describing the attributes that 
would best enable the Tribunal to serve as a legitimate source of justice for victims, while also 
having a progressive influence on State-based legal institutions and society as a whole. 
 
 
Before an unofficial1 “tribunal” organized by women’s rights activists during the 1993 
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights (“Vienna Conference”), a Bosnian woman voiced 
her despair, highlighting the international legal order’s tragic failure to adequately address 
sexual violence during armed conflict:  “When I heard Chin Sung Chung [describe her sexual 
enslavement at the hands of the Japanese army during WWII],” she said, “such an emptiness 
entered my soul because what happened over 40 years ago, what happened in Japan, is 
happening now.”2
Though the effects of armed conflict touch everyone, women have been recognized as 
                                                 
1 “Unofficial” refers herein to measures implemented by private entities without the authorization of a State or 
organization of States, such as the U.N. or E.U.; “official” measures are those authorized in whole or in part by 
a State or organization of States. 
2 Charlotte Bunch & Niamh Reilly, Demanding Accountability: The Global Campaign and Vienna Tribunal for 
Women’s Human Rights 36 (1994). 
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particularly vulnerable, due to “their status in society and their sex.”3  Gender-related crimes 
have occurred “on an astronomical scale” in past and present conflicts, and sexual violence in 
particular has been “exceedingly commonplace” in both intra- and international armed 
conflict.4  Although men are also victims5 of sexual violence during armed conflict, as recently 
highlighted by the atrocities committed at the U.S.-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq,6 rape and 
sexual slavery are much more often committed against women, and women are uniquely 
susceptible to the reproductive violations of forced pregnancy and forced abortion.7  Thus, most 
sexual violence in armed conflict can be seen a gender-based crime,8 and perceived license to 
commit sexual violence in armed conflict can be traced to what the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women calls “an unwritten legacy that violence against women during war is 
an accepted practice of conquering armies.”9  The effects of such violence on women, their 
families, and societies can be devastating, and endure for generations. 
The continuing prevalence of sexual violence in armed conflict stands in contrast to 
increased international recognition that rape, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual violence 
in armed conflict violate established international law, including humanitarian, human rights, 
                                                 
3 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, 15 September 1995, para. 
136, U.N. Docs. A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995). 
4 Kelly D. Askin, Discussion, The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender Justice, 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 509, 509 
(2003) [hereinafter Askin, Quest]; see also Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in 
International Law, 5 Eur. J. Int’l L. 326, 327 (1994) (“rape and sexual violence are common to virtually all 
armed conflicts”) [hereinafter Chinkin, International Law]. 
5 Use of the term “victim” has been criticized for disempowering those to whom it refers “by emphasizing their 
denial of and need for rights…strip[ping them] of choice and reduc[ing] their capacity for regaining agency.”  
Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution:  Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War 120 (2002).  Nevertheless, “victim” 
is used in this discussion because it highlights the criminal nature of the acts in question. 
6 See, e.g., Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, The Struggle for Iraq:  Investigations; Army Discloses Criminal 
Inquiry on Prison Abuse, N.Y. Times, May 5, 2004, at A1 (describing sexual humiliation of prisoners).  The 
involvement of two female soldiers in the Abu Ghraib abuses demonstrates that women, like men, can act as the 
perpetrators of sexual violence. 
7 Charlotte Lindsey, Women Facing War 51 (2001). 
8 Chinkin, International Law, supra note 4, at 339. 
9 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Commission on 
Human Rights, 54th Sess., at Part I, para. 1, Provisional Agenda Item 9(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (1998) 
[hereinafter Coomaraswamy, Report]. 
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and jus cogens prohibitions.10   But in spite of these legal prohibitions, sexual violence 
continues to occur in armed conflicts around the world,11 as illustrated by the most recently 
publicized case of widespread sexual violence currently being perpetrated in Sudan.12  The 
ongoing sexual violation of women during armed conflict exposes a pressing need for additional 
measures to end this dreadful form of gender-based violence. 
While a number of social and structural factors---including patriarchal conceptions of 
women as property rather than persons, and as bearers of cultural identity13---contribute to the 
continued use of sexual violence as a component of armed conflict, the U.N. Special Rapporteur 
on Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict has 
recognized that “the most immediate and effective deterrent to the use of sexual violence during 
armed conflict is to hold the perpetrators responsible for their crimes.”14  Indeed, accountability 
for the individuals, groups, and states responsible for sexual violence during armed conflict is 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Part II, para. 38, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993) 
(“Violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict are violations of the fundamental 
principles of international human rights and humanitarian law.  All violations of this kind, including in particular 
murder, systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy, require a particularly effective response.”).  A 
full explication of international legal prohibitions on sexual violence is outside the scope of this discussion.  For 
a review of the development of international humanitarian law prohibitions on rape and other forms of sexual 
violence, see Askin, Quest, supra note 4, at 290-305.  Askin argues that sexual violence may have achieved a 
status analogous to that of genocide, torture, slavery, and crimes against humanity as a jus cogens crime.  Id. at 
293-94. 
11 See, e.g., Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report on Violence Against Women Perpetrated and/or Condoned by the 
State During Times of Armed Conflict, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 57th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 
12(a), paras. 68-113, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/73 (2001) (reporting sexual violence committed against women in 
armed conflict between 1997 and 2000 in Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, East Timor, Kosovo, India, 
Indonesia, West Timor, Myanmar, Chechnya, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka) [hereinafter Coomaraswamy, Armed 
Conflict]. 
12 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Sudan, Darfur:  Rape as a Weapon of War, Index No. 54/076/2004, 
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AFR540762004ENGLISH/$File/AFR5407604.pdf (2004). 
13 See Lindsey, supra note 7, at 53 (arguing that woman are targeted for sexual violence due to their position in 
patriarchal societies as persons in need of male protection); Askin, Quest, supra note 4, at 298 (arguing that 
destructive capacity of rape stems from sexual stereotypes); Liz Kelly, Wars Against Women:  Sexual Violence, 
Sexual Politics and the Militarised State, in States of Conflict:  Gender, Violence and Resistance 45 (Susie Jacobs, 
et al., eds.) (2000) (“Women’s bodies and women as a group have…been constructed as the locus or carriers of 
culture.  It is this, coupled with misogyny, which makes them targets in military conflicts.”). 
14 Gay J. McDougall, Update to the Final Report on Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like 
Practices During Armed Conflict, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, 52d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 6, para. 21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/21 
(2000) [hereinafter McDougall, Update]. 
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critical not only for deterrence, but also to promote social reforms that advance the elimination 
of sexual violence,15 and to provide recompense, healing and closure to victims.16  To this end, 
mechanisms of accountability---courts, war crimes tribunals, and other innovative formats like 
truth commissions---must be equipped to document and make known the full truth of these 
atrocities, bring perpetrators to justice by identifying and punishing them, and provide an 
effective remedy to victims.17
The international community has come to appreciate the importance of such 
accountability, as evidenced by the establishment over the past eleven years of ad hoc  war 
crimes tribunals in Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and Rwanda (“ICTR”), the hybrid 
national/international Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), and the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”).18  These fora have made significant advances in addressing sexual violence as a 
violation of international law.  For example, criminal convictions for sexual violence as a war 
crime, a crime against humanity, and genocide have been issued by the ICTY and ICTR,19 and 
ten of the thirteen persons indicted by the SCSL face charges arising from sexual violence, 
                                                 
15 Increased awareness can help reverse the stigma attached to being a victim of sexual violence, thereby 
diminishing secondary harms to victims and their communities, and dismantling sexual violence as an effective 
weapon of war.  See Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes Under 
International Law:  Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 288, 347 (2003) 
(stressing importance of reversing stereotypes to reflect that sexual violence shames and dishonors its 
perpetrators, not its victims) [hereinafter Askin, Prosecuting]. 
16 See Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law:  
Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, at xliii (1997) (noting importance of accountability for these goals); Mani, supra 
note 5, at 7-8 (describing multiple benefits of accountability). 
17 Louis Joinet, Final Report on Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and 
Political), Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, 49th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 9, para. 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20 (1997) (determining 
that ending impunity requires the fulfillment of three basic rights of victims:  to know the truth, to justice, and to 
reparations). 
18 See Lindsey, supra note 7, at 150 (noting that prior to the establishment of the ICTY, there were few 
prosecutions of individuals for war crimes, with the exception of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals that 
followed WWII). 
19 See e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-T, Sep. 2, 1998 (conviction for rape as a form of 
genocide); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Judgment, IT-96-21-T, Nov. 16, 1988 (holding that sexual violence can 
constitute torture); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, IT-96-23T, Feb. 22, 2001 (conviction for rape, sexual 
slavery, and outrages on personal dignity as war crimes and crimes against humanity).  For a detailed analysis of 
recent ICTY and ICTR caselaw on sexual violence, see Askin, Prosecuting, supra note 15. 
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including the form of sexual slavery referred to as “forced marriage.”20  The legal prohibitions 
on sexual violence have also been further solidified, following intense lobbying by women’s 
organizations, in the statute of the newly formed ICC, which explicitly includes rape and other 
forms of sexual violence within its definitions of war crimes21 and crimes against humanity.22
Despite these promising strides, the abovementioned official tribunals suffer from a 
number of limitations on their ability to hold perpetrators fully accountable and to provide 
victims full justice.  The ICTY and ICTR have been criticized for failing to adopt a sufficiently 
gendered approach to sexual violence,23 and, although it represents a significant improvement 
on the terms of previous international legal prohibitions of sexual violence, the ICC has been 
subject to similar criticisms.24  These international bodies are also distant, both physically and 
psychically, from the societies for which they work to provide justice.  This can inhibit 
perceptions of accountability and justice within communities, in addition to drawing 
resentment for draining financial resources.25  The ICTY and ICTR have also had difficulty 
addressing sexual violence because their limited ability to protect victims’ identity, physical 
security, and psychological health make women reluctant to report and testify about sexual 
violence before them.26  Moreover, the perpetrator-oriented nature of war crimes tribunals and 
other adjudicative fora limits their ability to provide a full sense of justice to victims of sexual 
                                                 
20 See Special Court for Sierra Leone Website, at http://www.sc-sl.org (last visited Aug. 12, 2004). 
21 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(2)(b)(xxii), (2)(e)(vi), adopted July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
22 Id., at Art. 7(1)(g). 
23 See, e.g., Rosalinda Dixon, Rape as a Crime in International Humanitarian Law:  Where to From Here?, 13 
Eur. J. Int’l L. 697, 701-05 (2002) (criticizing ICTY for failure to identify “Muslim women” instead of 
“Muslims” as targeted population in Kunarac, and noting patriarchal connotations of viewing sexual violence 
against women as a form of genocide). 
24 See, e.g., Coomaraswamy, Armed Conflict, supra note 11, paras. 18-20 (objecting to element of intent to 
affect ethnic composition for crime of forced pregnancy before the ICC, and to biologically–associated 
definition of gender); McDougall, Update, supra note 14, para. 29 (criticizing implication in ICC rules that 
commercial transaction is necessary element of crime of sexual slavery). 
25 See Mani, supra note 5, at 98. 
26 Kelly, supra note 13, at 54; Coomaraswamy, Report ,  supra note 9. 
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violence.27  For example, strong procedural and evidentiary protections for the accused, 
necessary in any forum capable of imposing custodial sentences, may make testifying about 
their violations unduly dangerous or painful for women, or result in acquittals that deny them 
vindication altogether.  The ICTY, ICTR, and ICC also have limited powers to issue the 
reparations that are integral to full accountability.28
Even more distressing that these structural and procedural limits, however, is the fact that 
official mechanisms of accountability are unable or unwilling to address the vast majority of 
sexual violations in armed conflict.  Instances of sexual violence in armed conflict outside the 
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, or Sierra Leone that occurred before July 1, 2002 are not within the 
jurisdiction of any official international mechanism of accountability.  Further, resource 
constraints will drastically limit the capacity of the ICC to address crimes of sexual violence in 
future armed conflicts, forcing it to limit its efforts to the “worst” perpetrators. 
Accordingly, Special Rapporteur McDougall has determined that international 
mechanisms such as the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC will only be able to address “a small fraction” of 
sexual violence committed in armed conflict, and that national prosecution for all sexual 
violations is “imperative.”29  National courts, however, are rarely able or willing, for a variety 
of structural and political reasons, to provide satisfactory accountability after armed conflict.30  
Ultimately, the limiting factor for both official national and international mechanisms of 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 23, 705 (“the potential to recognise the specific and gendered harms suffered by the 
victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity is inherently limited within the international criminal 
process”); Chinkin, International Law,  supra note 4, at 337 (raising concern that ICTY would be perpetrator-
oriented); Mani, supra note 5, at 100 (describing limits of adversarial trials for achieving accountability). 
28 Christine M. Chinkin, Editorial Comment, Women’s International Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual 
Slavery, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 335, 340 (2001) [hereinafter Chinkin, Tribunal]; Dixon, supra note 23, at 710. 
29 McDougall, Update, supra note 14, para. 93. 
30 See,  e .g . ,  Yves Beigbeder, Judging War Criminals:  The Politics of International Justice 77-78, 135 (1999) 
(discussing obstacles to national justice and concluding that “even if national courts should…have 
jurisdiction…[it] may be long-delayed, or even denied on legal and/or political grounds, their impartiality may be 
challenged and their judgments labeled as victors’ justice.”).  For an example, see the discussion of Japan’s 
resistance to accountability for sexual slavery committed during WWII, infra Part II.B. 
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accountability is that they require the authorization and support of a State or international 
organization.  Despite significant progress made over the past decade, those entities have not 
had the will to fully and satisfactorily address sexual violence in armed conflict by expanding 
the jurisdiction of existing courts, providing adequate funding for their operation, or 
consistently bringing perpetrators to justice. 
The pressing need for more accountability than is currently available in existing fora is 
demonstrated by the continued incidence of sexual violence in armed conflict.  The fact that such 
atrocities are frequently committed in public further underscores the reality that perpetrators 
either do not believe their actions are prohibited, or do not anticipate that they will be held 
accountable.31  This is hardly surprising, since it remains the case that “an overwhelming 
majority” of those who commit sexual violence are not brought to justice, and that “few 
survivors ever receive justice or any other form of accountability or reparation….”32  Because 
the practical, structural and political limitations discussed above leave official mechanisms of 
accountability without the capacity to provide full accountability for sexual violence in armed 
conflict, unofficial mechanisms should be considered as potential means to pressure governments 
and international organizations to address these limitations, and as a means to help victims 
achieve justice directly.33
The following discussion will propose the use of one such unofficial mechanism---the 
people’s tribunal---as an effective supplement to official accountability for sexual violence in 
armed conflict.  Part I describes the development and use of people’s tribunals as mechanisms of 
                                                 
31 Lindsey, supra note 7, at 52. 
32 Askin, Quest ,  supra note 4, at 520. 
33 See Mani, supra note 5, at 113 (“Sometimes when a government is unwilling to do much to address the 
past…unofficial measures undertaken by independent civil society groups outside the authority of governments 
assume importance.  They may serve the role and functions of official mechanisms, or even outdo them in 
providing a measure of justice to citizens.”). 
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unofficial accountability, especially for the international women’s movement.  In Part II, a 
previous effort by women’s groups to adapt the people’s tribunal format to address sexual 
violence in armed conflict is presented as a model.  The effectiveness of that tribunal, and the 
people’s tribunal format in general, is critically evaluated in Part III, leading to the conclusion 
that a people’s tribunal could make a significant contribution to official mechanisms of 
accountability for sexual violence in armed conflict.  To that end, Part IV advocates the 
establishment of a Permanent Women’s Tribunal for Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict 
(“PWT”), and describes the features that would best enable it to serve as a progressive influence 
on official legal institutions and society, while also functioning as a legitimate, though unofficial, 
mechanism of legal accountability in its own right. 
 
I.  Development of people’s tribunals as unofficial mechanisms of accountability 
A “people’s tribunal,” generally resembles a judicial trial: evidence is presented, usually 
in a public session, and a judgment or analysis of the evidence on the basis of relevant legal 
instruments is issued by a panel of legal or other experts.  Organized and executed by private 
entities, people’s tribunals base their authority and legitimacy on “the understanding that ‘law is 
an instrument of civil society’ that does not belong to governments.”34  Thus, “the people” are 
competent to invoke and apply law in an unofficial forum, even when governments are unwilling 
or unable to do so in any official tribunal. 
Although their unofficial status creates significant limitations for people’s tribunals, it 
also conveys on them two unique benefits:  first, since they require no government sanction, 
they can be used as a “fallback” forum when governments fail to ensure accountability for 
                                                 
34 Chinkin, Tribunal, supra note 28, at 339 (quoting Richard Falk, The Rights of People (In Particular 
Indigenous Peoples), in The Rights of Peoples 17, 29 (James Crawford ed., 1988)). 
Terrell 9 
international law violations; second, people’s tribunals have more freedom to formulate their 
mandate and procedures in response to the demands of particular circumstances and the needs 
of victims.  The following discussion explores the development of the people’s tribunal as a 
tool for political and legal activism, and describes how the women’s movement in particular 
has capitalized on the format’s two key advantages. 
A. The Russell Tribunal 
The people’s tribunal format was first developed in 1967 in the “Russell Tribunal” on 
U.S. military action in Vietnam.35  Created by Bertrand Russell, and headed by French 
philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, the Russell Tribunal met twice to hear evidence on alleged 
aggression and war crimes committed by the U.S. in southeast Asia.36  Its organizers argued that 
the creation of an unofficial, judicial-style tribunal was necessitated by the absence of any 
official venue for trying international war crimes.37
The Russell Tribunal heard evidence from journalists, experts, eyewitnesses (including 
civilians injured during the war and three U.S. soldiers who admitted to participating in torture), 
and its own investigative team, sent to Vietnam to verify claims of the destruction of civilian 
targets.38  In the interest of fairness, the tribunal’s organizers invited the U.S. to send a 
representative to argue for the legality of its actions.39  When the invitation was not accepted, 
tribunal members considered instead a U.S. government memorandum setting out the arguments 
                                                 
35 See generally Against the Crime of Silence:  Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal 
(John Duffett ed., 1968) [hereinafter Russell Proceedings]. 
36 Beigbeder, supra note 30, at 139. 
37 Jean Paul Sartre, Inaugural Statement, in Russell Proceedings, supra note 35. 
38 Verdict of the Stockholm Session, in Russell Proceedings, supra note 35, at 302, 302; Testimony and 
Questioning of David Kenneth Tuck, in Russell Proceedings, supra note 35, at 403; Testimony and Questioning of 
Peter Martinsen, in Russell Proceedings, supra note 35, at 425; Testimony and Questioning of Donald Duncan, in 
Russell Proceedings, supra note 35, at 457. 
39 Statement of the President of Session, in Russell Proceedings, supra note 35, at 52, 52. 
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for legality to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.40  The tribunal evaluated U.S. actions in 
light of several international legal instruments, including the Kellogg-Briand Pact, U.N. Charter, 
Hague Regulations, Nuremberg Statute, Geneva Conventions, and peace agreements that 
concluded the Vietnamese war for independence.41
Because it had no power to enforce its verdicts, the Russell Tribunal limited its 
judgment to whether and by whom a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the WWII-era 
Nuremberg Tribunal had been committed, and what punishment would have been applicable 
had the Nuremberg Tribunal adjudicated the matter.42  The purpose of the exercise was, thus, to 
raise awareness not only about the illegality of U.S. actions in Vietnam, but also “to bring 
about a general recognition of the need for an [official] international institution for which [the 
Russell Tribunal] has neither the means nor the ambition to be a substitute….”43  The Russell 
Tribunal sought to encourage, rather than replace, official mechanisms of accountability. 
B. Subsequent application of people’s tribunal format 
 The Russell Tribunal addressed three other cases between 1974 and 1980: democratic 
rights in Latin America, civil rights violations in West Germany, and the rights of indigenous 
peoples in America.44  It also inspired the foundation, in 1979, of the Permanent People’s 
Tribunal (“PPT”) by the Lelio Basso International Foundation for the Rights and Liberation of 
the Peoples.45  The PPT distinguished itself from the Russell Tribunal, however, in that it 
focused on the “law of peoples,” which is “established not by states, but by the requirements 
                                                 
40 Verdict of the Stockholm Session, supra note 38, at 304-05. 
41 Id. at 305-08. 
42 Sartre, supra note 37, at 43. 
43 Id. 
44 Beigbeder, supra note 30, at 140. 
45 Id. at 141.  Lelio Basso was a juror at the original Russell Tribunal.  Lelio Basso International Foundation, 
Presentation webpage, at http://www.grisnet.it/filb/filbeng.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2004). 
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and exigencies of peoples.”46  Over the past fifteen years, it has held thirty-one sessions on 
violations of the rights of specific ethnic or national groups, the rights of children, workers 
rights, and violations committed by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and private 
corporations.47  The PPT met most recently in 2002 to address “International Law and the ‘New 
Wars.’”48
 In addition to the PPT, myriad ad hoc people’s tribunals have been based on the Russell 
Tribunal model.  These have addressed a wide variety of legal and political issues, ranging 
from war crimes,49 to violations arising from colonial expansion,50 to environmental damage,51 
to corporate responsibility for crimes against humanity,52 to the allegedly unjust imprisonment 
and death sentence of activist Mumia Abu-Jamaal.53  These and other similar tribunals vary 
widely in their legal content, formality, and procedures. 
C. Use of people’s tribunal format by the international women’s movement 
The people’s tribunal format has special utility for the international women’s 
                                                 
46 Lelio Basso Foundation, Permanent People’s Tribunal webpage, at http://www.grisnet.it/filb/tribu%20eng.html 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2004) [hereinafter PPT Webpage]; see also Beigbeder, supra note 30, at 141 (noting that in 
addition to international humanitarian law, human rights conventions, and U.N. declarations and resolutions, the 
PPT applies the Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples, an anti-imperialist document proclaimed by 
the Lelio Basso Foundation in 1976). 
47 Lelio Basso Foundation, Permanent People’s Tribunal Sentences webpage, at 
http://www.grisnet.it/filb/sentenze_eng.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2004) (list of PPT sessions) [hereinafter PPT 
Sentences]. 
48 PPT Webpage, supra note 46. 
49 See Beigbeder, supra note 30, at 137-38 (describing people’s tribunal held in 1992 to try U.S. officials for 
aggression and crimes against humanity stemming from their conduct during the first Iraq war). 
50 See Sally Engle Merry, Resistance and the Cultural Power of Law, 1994 Presidential Address Before the Law 
and Society Association, in 29 Law & Soc’y Rev. 11, 20-22 (1995) (describing People’s International Tribunal 
that charged the U.S. with crimes committed during nineteenth century takeover of Hawaii). 
51 A permanent Indian People’s Tribunal on Human Rights and the Environment has been established.  See 800 
Starvation Deaths in Gardens, The Statesman, Mar. 24, 2004 (describing Indian People’s Tribunal findings 
regarding hunger-related deaths).  An International Peoples’ Tribunal on Human Rights and the Environment, 
founded by a coalition of NGOs, met in New York in June 1997.  Beigbeder, supra note 30, at 144. 
52 Global People’s Tribunal on Corporate Crimes Against Humanity, at 
http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/apcorp.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2004) (announcing plans to hold people’s 
tribunal during World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle, Washington in November, 1999). 
53 See International People’s Tribunal---The Case of Mumia Abu-Jamaal, Dec. 21, 1997, at 
http://www.infoshop.org/gulag/news/rw_tribunal.html. 
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movement because it complements more established forms of women’s activism, such as 
grassroots organization, with the formal legitimacy of law.54  A number of public hearings and 
tribunals have been initiated by women’s organizations, becoming increasingly formalized 
and mirroring more closely the procedures employed in official judicial fora over time. 
Tribunal formats were first employed by women activists at the International Tribunal 
on Crimes Against Women, held in Brussels in 1976 and the World Women’s Congress for a 
Healthy Planet, held in Miami in 1991.55  Later, as part of the campaign for recognition of 
women’s rights during the buildup to the Vienna Conference, a series of public hearings and 
“speakouts” were held.  These took place in a number of different countries, beginning in 
November 1992, and featured the testimony of women who had experienced human rights 
violations.  These testimonies were recorded and sent to the U.N. Centre for Human Rights as 
evidence of the need for more attention on women’s human rights.56  No formal legal analysis 
or judgment, however, was produced on the basis of these testimonies. 
The Global Tribunal on Violations of Women’s Human Rights (“Vienna Tribunal”), 
held in Vienna on June 15, 1993 in parallel to the Vienna Conference’s official activities, took 
a more formal approach.  The Vienna Tribunal was intended to increase awareness of 
women’s human rights issues among the official delegates and “mainstream” NGOs attending 
the Vienna Conference, and to capitalize on increased media visibility to raise awareness 
about the failure of human rights enforcement mechanisms to adequately protect women’s 
                                                 
54 See Chinkin, Tribunal, supra note 28, at 340 (describing use of people’s tribunal by women’s groups as 
successful example of “devising strategies that combine traditional women’s organizing methodologies…with 
procedural initiatives that have already acquired legitimacy within civil society”); cf. Carlin Meyer, Review 
Essay, Crimes Against Humanity Women:  The Uncomfortable Stories of “Comfort Women,” 17 New York L. 
Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 1019, 1041-43 (2001) (reviewing Comfort Women Speak: Testimony by Sex Slaves of the 
Japanese Military (Sangmie Choi Schellstede ed., 2000)) (noting that women have engaged in “collective 
storytelling” in response to the discrediting of “women’s ‘truths’…by traditional methods of…arriving at ‘truth,’” 
but have turned to the law for legitimation when these stories have been disregarded as biased or exaggerated). 
55 Bunch & Reilly, supra note 2, at 9. 
56 Id. at 7-8. 
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human rights.57  The tribunal employed a panel of distinguished judges58 who delivered a final 
statement applying international law to find violations of human rights and humanitarian law, 
identifying the failure of the human rights system to adequately protect women’s rights, and 
making recommendations for improvement.59  Among their findings, the judges concluded---
five years before the ICTR’s landmark ruling in Akayesu---that rape, forced prostitution, and 
forced pregnancy constitute torture, and can amount to crimes against humanity when 
committed on a systematic basis.60
Despite the trial-like format described above, the substance and procedure of the 
Vienna Tribunal suggest that it was intended more as a consciousness-raising tool of activism 
than as an unofficial mechanism of accountability.  For example, each woman who testified 
delivered prepared remarks, coordinated ahead of time by tribunal moderators.61  This 
selective use of testimony would raise concerns about procedural fairness and substantive 
accuracy in a tribunal that sought to make legal determinations of criminal accountability. 
Indeed, the Vienna Tribunal organizers were careful to emphasize that it could issue no legally 
binding judgment, and that women should consider their participation as a political action.62
D. Potential for continuing development and utility of people’s tribunal format 
The Russell Tribunal justified its existence on the absence of an official forum for 
adjudicating violations of the laws of war.  However, the establishment, since the early 1990s, 
of several official international mechanisms for accountability, including the ICC, has not lead to 
                                                 
57 Id. at 10. 
58 Bunch & Reilly, supra note 2, at 15-16. 
59 Id. at 84-87.  The judges’ recommendations were officially submitted to the Vienna Conference.  See 
Report of the Global Tribunal on Violations of Women’s Human Rights, in Bunch & Reilly, supra note 2, at 
130. 
60 Id. at 87. 
61 Id. at 14-15. 
62 Id. 
Terrell 14 
a corresponding decrease in the establishment and activity of people’s tribunals.63  The PPT 
alone has held eleven sessions since the ICTY was established in 1993, one of which 
specifically addressed the violence in the former Yugoslavia.64  Beigbeder attributes the 
continuing use of people’s tribunals to a growing need to express “a populist counter-power 
versus the power of governments,” a need he links to the growing NGO movement.65  The 
work of women’s rights NGOs at the Vienna Tribunal demonstrates their recognition that the 
people’s tribunal format holds promise as a tool of activism to pressure official institutions to 
increase recognition of violations committed against women.  Seven years later, a group of 
Asian women’s NGOs further developed the format to provide not only a means to raise 
awareness, but also to produce a full evidentiary and legal analysis of sexual violence 
committed by Japan during WWII, thereby adapting the people’s tribunal into a mechanism for 
providing unofficial legal accountability. 
II.  The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal 
The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery 
(“Women’s Tribunal”) was established by a coalition of Asian women’s NGOs to address 
Japan’s system of military sexual slavery during WWII.  The circumstances surrounding its 
creation are illustrative of the continuing inadequacy of official mechanisms of accountability, 
while the procedural measures its organizers took to maximize its credibility and impact, along 
with its focus on sexual violence, make it an informative case study for evaluating whether, 
and by what procedures, a people’s tribunal can contribute to unofficial accountability for 
sexual violence in armed conflict. 
                                                 
63 See Beigbeder, supra note 30, at 144-45. 
64 PPT Sentences, supra note 47. 
65 Beigbeder, supra note 30, at 144-45. 
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A. Japan’s “comfort system”66 
 Between 1932 and the end of WWII, over 200,000 women were forced into sexual 
slavery in military brothels established or supervised by the Japanese government,67 apparently 
in an effort to minimize opposition arising from the rape of local women by occupying 
Japanese soldiers, protect troops from the spread of sexually transmitted disease, and minimize 
security risks from spies who might operate in privately-run brothels.68  These women, 
euphemistically referred to as “comfort women,” were “recruited” into sexual slavery by both 
private and military actors who used a variety of tactics, including deception, coercion, and 
abduction.69  They were forced to “service” up to forty soldiers a day, subjected to beatings and 
torture, repeatedly made pregnant and forced to undergo abortion, and exposed to sexually 
transmitted disease and the risks of living in zones of intense military combat.70  Of the roughly 
twenty-five percent who survived,71 some were unable to make their way back to their country 
of origin, and even those who did return continued to suffer physical and emotional pain, 
infertility, humiliation, and social stigma as a result of their violation. 
B. Inadequate official accountability leads to creation of the Women’s Tribunal 
The Women’s Tribunal was established in response to these atrocities after a decade of 
activism and legal action in all available official fora---including the Japanese legislature, 
                                                 
66 The tragic history of the “comfort system” has been treated in depth elsewhere.  E.g., Yuki Tanaka, Japan’s 
Comfort Women:  Sexual Slavery and Prostitution During World War II and the U.S. Occupation (2003).  For an 
analysis of Japan’s legal liability for the “comfort system,” see Gay J. McDougall, Final Report on Systematic 
Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 50th Sess., Provisional Agenda 
Item 6, app. 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (1998) (analyzing Japan’s legal liability for “ comfort stations”) 
[hereinafter McDougall Report]. 
67 McDougall Report, supra note 66, app. 1, para. 1. 
68 Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the 
Centre for Human Rights, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 52d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 9(a), Annex 1, 
para. 2(1), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/137 (1996) [hereinafter Japan Report]. 
69 See Carmen M. Argibay, Sexual Slavery and the “Comfort Women” of World War I, 21 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 
375, 377-79 (2003). 
70 Tanaka, Comfort Women, supra note 66, at 50-60. 
71 McDougall Report, supra note 66, app. 1, para. 7. 
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domestic and foreign courts, and international organizations72---failed to result in official 
acknowledgement of legal liability by Japan, prosecution of those responsible for the “comfort 
system,” or an official grant of monetary or other reparations by the government. 
At the conclusion of WWII, Allied prosecutors raised only a few instances of rape 
before the Tokyo Tribunal, and failed to bring any charges arising from Japan’s system of 
military sexual slavery, despite their knowledge of its existence.73  Their failure to hold the 
perpetrators of the “comfort system” accountable for violation of the laws of war and 
international prohibitions on slavery and forced labor lead to half a century of silence, during 
which survivors of Japan’s sexual slavery suffered in isolation.  The issue did not resurface 
again until academic research on the subject prompted women’s groups to engage in 
activism, demanding that Japan pay reparations.  Efforts by Japanese legislators to initiate 
investigations into the issue were, however, rebuffed by the government, which insisted that 
all brothels used by the military had been privately operated.74  Subsequent efforts to pass 
legislation to provide official compensation for survivors have repeatedly been defeated.75
In the absence of a satisfactory response from Japan’s executive and legislative bodies, women 
turned to the court system.  In 1991, several survivors filed the first lawsuit in Japanese court 
seeking damages for injuries resulting from the “comfort system.”76  Since then, of several other 
civil suits filed in Japanese courts by former comfort women, “nearly all” have been rejected on 
a variety of legal rationales, including:  laches and statutes of limitation, determinations that no 
                                                 
72 The international criminal tribunals and ICC were not an option for achieving accountability in this instance of 
sexual violence, as will often be the case for violations in other past armed conflicts, because none of them had 
jurisdiction over violations committed during WWII in Japan. 
73 Yayori Matsui, Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery:  
Memory, Identity, and Society, in Japanese War Crimes 259, 274 (Peter Li ed., 2003) (describing rejection of 
application by Korean survivors by Prosecutor’s Office). 
74 Chunghee Sarah Soh, The Korean “Comfort Women,”  36 Asian Survey 1226 (1996). 
75 Christine Wawrynek, U.N. Reports, World War I Comfort Women:  Japan’s Sex Slaves or Hired 
Prostitutes?, 19 N.Y. L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 913, 921 (2003). 
76 Soh, supra note 74. 
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private right of action exists for violations of international law, and the purported extinguishment 
of all residual claims by peace treaties signed at the end of WWII.77  The one suit that did 
succeed in an judgment for the plaintiffs was reversed on appeal:  a branch of the Yamaguchi 
District Court awarded 300,000 yen to each of three former “comfort women” in 1998, finding 
that the Japanese legislature’s failure to pass a compensation statute violated both statutory and 
constitutional law.78  Unfortunately, the decision was overturned in 2001 by the Hiroshima High 
Court, which determined that the women’s abduction and sexual slavery were “not…serious 
constitutional violation[s].”79  Efforts to initiate criminal prosecutions in Japan against the 
perpetrators of the “comfort system” have also failed,80 as have efforts to obtain a civil judgment 
for violations of international law in U.S. courts.81
Women’s advocates also sought accountability for the “comfort system” in international 
fora, achieving some limited success.  In March 1992, a Korean women’s group petitioned the 
U.N. Human Rights Commission for an investigation into the issue and assistance in pressing for 
compensation.82  Several survivors testified before the Commission later that year, and the Sub-
Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities deemed the 
                                                 
77 Meyer, supra note 54, at 1029-30; see also Coomaraswamy, Armed Conflict, supra note 11, paras. 94 -95, 
(describing litigation by former “comfort women” in Japanese courts). 
78 Coomaraswamy, Armed Conflict, supra note 11, para. 94. 
79 Francine Pickup et al., Ending Violence Against Women:  A Challenge for Development and Humanitarian 
Work 136 (2001). 
80 Matsui, supra note 73, at 274. 
81 Several former “comfort women” filed a claim under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, which provides 
federal courts with jurisdiction over torts committed, in violation of international law, against noncitizens.  Their 
claim was dismissed on a number of jurisdictional grounds, Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F.Supp.2d 52 
(D.D.C. 2001), and the dismissal upheld on several of these grounds, including that the 1976 statute granting an 
exception to sovereign immunity for “commercial activity” could not be applied retroactively, 332 F.3d 679, 687 
(D.C.Cir. 2003).  The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the appeals court’s decision on the basis of its 
holding in another case that the commercial activity exception does apply retroactively.  124 S.Ct. 2835 (2004).  
Nonetheless, on remand the appeals court resoundingly affirmed the claim’s dismissal, finding that it presented a 
nonjusticiable political question---whether peace treaties between Japan and the plaintiffs’ countries at the end of 
WWII extinguished all claims arising therefrom---the judicial resolution of which would adversely affect U.S. 
foreign relations.  Joo v. Japan, No. 01-7169, 2005 WL 1513014 (D.C. Cir. Jun. 28, 2005). 
82 Soh, supra note 74. 
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“comfort system” a crime against humanity.83  Subsequent reports by the International 
Commission of Jurists,84 the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,85 and the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Systematic Rape and Sexual Slavery86 have repeatedly called for 
Japan to accept legal responsibility for the system of sexual slavery, punish those responsible, 
and provide compensation to victims.  In fact, growing awareness about the “comfort system” in 
the early 1990s was “[a] significant impetus for the creation of the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur” on Systematic Rape and Sexual Slavery.87  Despite this progress in international 
fora, no binding decision holding Japan accountable has been issued by an international tribunal 
or organization, and, as demonstrated by both Special Rapporteurs’ reports of Japan’s failure to 
comply with their recommendations, little real accountability has resulted. 
Indeed, it was not until documentary evidence of governmental involvement was 
discovered in 1992 that Japan admitted its direct participation in the “comfort system,” 
acknowledging a year later that at least some women were coerced into sexual slavery.88
In 1995, Japan sidestepped continued pressure to compensate victims of sexual slavery by 
establishing the Asian Women’s Fund (“AWF”) to provide “atonement money” to 
survivors.89  The AWF, largely funded by private donations and unaccompanied by any 
official apology or acceptance of legal responsibility by the government, has been widely 
rejected by survivors, who perceive it as a means of perpetuating state impunity.90  
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 Ustinia Dolgopol & Snehal Paranjape, Comfort Women: An Unfinished Ordeal 105 (1994). 
85 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report on the Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic 
of Korea and Japan on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime, Commission on Human Rights, 52d 
Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 9(a), para. 137, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.1 (1996); Coomaraswamy, 
Armed Conflict, supra note 77, para. 92. 
86 McDougall Report, supra note 66, paras. 22-23; McDougall Update, supra note 14, paras. 72, 78. 
87 McDougall, Update, supra note 14, at 71. 
88 Meyer, supra note 54, at 1030-31; see Japan Report, supra note 68, Annex 1, para. 2(7). 
89 Coomaraswamy, Armed Conflict, supra note 77, para. 93. 
90 Meyer, supra note 54, at 1031; Matsui, supra note 73, at 268.  But see Coomaraswamy, Armed Conflict, supra 
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Consequently, Special Rapporteur McDougall reported in 2000 that the violations 
committed through Japan’s military sexual slavery “remain largely unremedied” due to the 
lack of reparations, official compensation, official acceptance of legal responsibility, and 
prosecution of those responsible.91
It was this failure of governments and international organizations to provide 
accountability in any official venue that prompted the Violence Against Women in War 
Network, Japan (“VAWW-NET, Japan”), a coalition of Japanese women committed to 
ending impunity for sexual slavery during WWII, to propose the Women’s Tribunal in 
1998.92  NGOs from China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and both Koreas---all 
countries from which women had been forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military--
-joined VAWW-NET, Japan at preparatory conferences in 1998 and 1999 to research and 
draft the tribunal’s Charter.93  The Women’s Tribunal aimed to achieve several objectives: 
to acknowledge the illegality of the “comfort system” and to encourage Japan to accept 
legal responsibility and provide reparations,94 and to work toward the elimination of 
violence against women in armed conflict by ending impunity for Japan’s military sexual 
slavery.95
C. Jurisdiction and proceedings 
The proceedings of the Women’s Tribunal have been described as “(quasi-) criminal,” 
                                                                                                                                                             
note 11, para. 93 (observing that 170 women have received funds from AWF, and referring to its work as 
“laudable”). 
91 McDougall, Update, supra note 14, para. 72. 
92 See Chinkin, Tribunal, supra note 28, at 336. 
93 Id. 
94 Matsui, supra note 73, at 259.  The tribunal’s Charter notes that the elderly survivors of the “comfort system” 
are passing away at a steady rate without having received “a word of acknowledgment of the crimes by the 
perpetrators,” a “genuine apology,” or reparations.  Charter of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal 
on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery (Incorporating Modifications Agreed upon During the Hague Meeting, 26-27 
October 2000), Preamble, at http://www1.jca.apc.org/vaww-net-japan/english (last visited Jul. 30, 2004) 
[hereinafter Women’s Tribunal Charter]. 
95 Matsui, supra note 73, at 259. One Dutch survivor testified at the tribunal that she felt obliged to speak out 
about her experience because she had heard that similar sex crimes were occurring in Bosnia. Id., at 263. 
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since they involved criminal charges and maintained the high standards of fairness and 
credibility required of criminal adjudication, but also incorporated aspects of civil mechanisms 
of accountability, including the absence of the accused, lack of authority to issue custodial 
sentences, and, critically, the fact that the authority under which the accused were prosecuted 
stemmed from “civil society” itself.96  Indeed, the jurisdiction and procedures of the Women’s 
Tribunal were very similar to those of the war crimes tribunals and ICC, adjusted in order to 
both minimize the drawbacks, and take advantage of the flexibility, of the tribunal’s unofficial 
nature. 
1.  Jurisdiction.---The proceedings of the Women’s Tribunal were framed as a 
continuation of the post-WWII Tokyo Tribunal, which, organizers emphasized, had failed to 
adequately address issues of rape and sexual slavery.97  Its Charter confers jurisdiction over 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other crimes under international law committed 
against women in countries under Japanese control during WWII, explicitly including crimes 
of “sexual slavery, rape and other forms of sexual violence.”98  This jurisdiction was 
unrestricted by any statute of limitations, on the rationale that there can be no limitation of 
accountability for crimes against humanity.99  Like official war crimes tribunals and the ICC, 
the Women’s Tribunal had jurisdiction over individuals involved in planning, committing, or 
concealing violations either directly of via command responsibility.100  But, the Women’s 
Tribunal was unique in that it also had jurisdiction to determine state responsibility for 
individual violations committed by state actors, and for states’ failure to investigate and 
                                                 
96 Dixon, supra note 23, at 707-08. 
97 See Chinkin, supra note 34, at 336-37. 
98 Women’s Tribunal Charter, supra note 94, Art. 2(1). Thus, all forms of sexual violence are more clearly 
identified with crimes against humanity and war crimes than they were in the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR. 
99 Women’s Tribunal Charter, supra note 94, Arts. 6, 71. 
100 Id. ,  Art. 3. 
Terrell 21 
disclose the truth about such violations, prosecute those responsible, prevent their recurrence, 
protect human dignity, or prevent discrimination.101  Thus, its mandate was more carefully 
tailored to address the full range of violations arising from the conflict in question than those of 
similar official fora. 
2.  Procedure.---Though the unofficial nature of the Women’s Tribunal left its creators 
free to adopt any procedure they chose, they were careful to “strictly observe[] procedural 
constraints” in order to ensure the tribunal’s “fairness and credibility.”102
A mixed-gender panel of five judges from Africa, North and South America, Europe and 
Southeast Asia was selected (though one ultimately was unable to participate) to include 
experts in a variety of relevant legal subjects with experience as practitioners, judges, and 
academics. They were aided by legal advisers, but for purposes of fairness and objectivity, 
were required to remain separate from prosecutors.103
Prosecution teams from countries whose citizens had been victims of sexual violence at 
the hands of the Japanese military prepared formal indictments.  These were joined in a 
common indictment by two lead prosecutors---one a member of the ICTY Office of the 
Prosecutor, and the other a law professor.104  The common indictment charged Japan’s 
Emperor Hirohito and eight other officials from the WWII period with crimes against 
humanity for the “comfort system,” and charged Hirohito and Yamashita Tomoyuki, 
Commander of Japan’s 14th Army in the Philippines, with crimes against humanity for rapes 
committed in Mapanique, the Philippines, on November 23-24, 1944.105  Prosecutors also filed 
                                                 
101 Id., Art. 4. 
102 Chinkin, Tribunal, supra note 28, at 337. 
103 Id., at 338. 
104 Id. ,  336 & nn. 7-8. 
105 Oral Judgment Delivered on 4 December 2001 by the Judges of the Women’s International War Crimes 
Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery, paras. 11-12, available at http://www1.jca.apc.org/vaww-net-
japan/english (last visited Jul. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Oral Judgment]. 
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an Application for Restitution and Reparations, arguing that Japan bore state responsibility, 
and owed reparations, for harm resulting from the crimes allegedly committed by Hirohito and 
his officials, and for “continuing harm” resulting from Japan’s failure to prosecute those 
responsible, or provide reparations.106  To ensure fairness and legitimacy, the Women’s 
Tribunal served current Japanese officials with notice of the charges, and invited them to 
participate in the proceedings.  When Japan declined to send an official representative, the 
Women’s Tribunal appointed a Japanese law firm to present the arguments against state 
responsibility as amicus curiae, and also considered the reasoning in Japanese court 
decisions rejecting claims of state responsibility.107
Another procedural safeguard was the formal entry of all evidence into an official 
registry,108 though strict admissibility constraints, such as the prohibition on hearsay evidence, 
were not applied since the Charter requires the admissibility of all “relevant physical and 
material evidence.”109 As Dixon has observed, even the category of “relevant” evidence was 
broader than it would have been in an official tribunal:  since the Women’s Tribunal focused on 
acknowledging the harm done to victims of the “comfort system” and recommending 
reparations, it was able to investigate the circumstances and effects of the sexual violence in 
question more broadly than would be relevant to establishing criminal liability.  Thus, the 
tribunal was could emphasize survivors’ “specific and context-dependent experiences of 
primary and secondary victimisation, and their suffering both then and now.”110
Over three days of formal proceedings, the Women’s Tribunal heard testimony from 
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thirty-five of the roughly seventy-five surviving “comfort women” who attended,111 as well as 
testimony from two Japanese soldiers who had used “comfort stations,” four Japanese scholars 
in the fields of military and legal history, an legal expert on state responsibility, and the 
director of a Yugoslavian organization for the victims of sexual violence, who testified about 
post-traumatic stress disorder among victims.  It also reviewed documentary evidence from 
government records and memoirs connecting the Japanese government to the “comfort 
system,” and amicus briefs concerning the status of litigation in Japanese courts and a draft of 
compensation legislation prepared by a Japanese lawyers’ association.112  In order to process 
the voluminous factual and legal evidence, the tribunal recessed for a day while the judges 
deliberated, and reconvened on December 12, 2000 to hear their preliminary judgment.  One 
year later, a final judgment was delivered in oral and written form at the Hague. 
D. Judgment 
 1.  Law applied.---The Women’s Tribunal judges applied only those laws that 
existed during the period when the crimes were committed.113  These laws were, however, 
interpreted in light of subsequent legal understandings, advances in women’s human rights, and 
“evolving principles of state responsibility for past violations,”114 thus permitting an 
interpretation at once progressive in its gender analysis and firmly grounded in established 
legal norms.  The judges determined that rape was a violation of the laws and customs of war 
extant during the WWII period, and that sexual slavery was prohibited under the terms of 
several international agreements, including the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1926 Slavery 
                                                 
111 Oral Judgment, supra note 105, paras. 2, 5. 
112 See  Chinkin, Tribunal, supra note 28, at 337; Meyer, supra note 54, at 1032; Matsui, supra note 73, at 
263. 
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Convention.115  They also adopted a broad definition of “sexual slavery” to include “the 
exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person by 
exercising sexual control over a person or depriving a person of sexual autonomy.”116  This 
definition avoids the implication, present in the ICC definition,117 that a commercial 
transaction is a necessary element of the crime of sexual slavery.118  Finally, the judges found, 
as a matter of general international law, that a state is responsible for violations of international 
law attributable to it, and that it is obliged to provide adequate reparations for any breach of its 
international duties.119
 2.  Individual liability.---Applying this law to the facts established before them 
regarding “the power and authority of the accused, their knowledge of the criminal nature of 
the ‘comfort system,’ and their continued participation in establishing, maintaining or facilitating 
the system,” the Women’s Tribunal judges found all of the accused guilty, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, of direct and command responsibility for rape and sexual slavery as crimes against 
humanity.120  They also found Yamashita guilty of both direct and command responsibility for 
rape as a crime against humanity committed at Mapanique, but convicted Hirohito only on the 
basis of command responsibility, acquitting him on the charge of direct responsibility for rape 
as a crime against humanity because there was insufficient evidence to indicate that he had 
specific knowledge of the mass rapes at Mapanique, or participated in them in any way.121  
                                                 
115 Oral Judgment, supra note 105, paras. 76, 78. 
116 Id., para. 79. 
117 E.g., International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2, U.N. Doc. 
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This willingness to acquit on the basis of insufficient evidence, in addition to the judges’ 
careful consideration of various mitigating circumstances---such as the claim that Hirohito was a 
figurehead with no knowledge of the crimes committed by his troops, nor power to stop them, 
and consideration of whether the short tenure of another of the accused might indicate his 
ignorance of the “comfort system”---indicates that the judges functioned independently of the 
beliefs of the Women’s Tribunal organizers, and of the prosecution teams who advanced the 
charges, despite the tribunal’s unofficial, ad hoc, status. 
 3.  State responsibility.---The Women’s Tribunal exercised its unique jurisdiction over 
state responsibility to find that the individual crimes against humanity described above were 
attributable to the government of Japan because they were committed by government agents, and 
because of the government’s failure to prevent or punish their commission.122  The judges also 
found the government guilty of continuing violations arising from its concealment of documents 
regarding the crimes at issue; failure to issue a genuine apology, punish those responsible, or 
provide official compensation;123 continued opposition to efforts to obtain reparations in its 
national courts; and failure to counteract revisionist claims that “comfort women” were voluntary 
prostitutes.124
 The defenses against state responsibility presented on Japan’s behalf were all considered 
and rejected.  The judges found that individuals can exercise a right of action to seek 
compensation for violations of international humanitarian law, and that peace treaties concluded 
at the end of the war could not exhaust the legal rights of “comfort women” because of the erga 
omnes nature of crimes against humanity, and because the lack of effective representation for 
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women at treaty negotiations undermined the resulting agreements’ legitimacy.125
 4.  Reparations.---Finally, the judges recommended “comprehensive” reparations, 
including a “full and frank apology,” acceptance of legal responsibility for and acknowledgment 
of the criminal nature of the “comfort system,” establishment of memorial and educational 
initiatives, payment of monetary compensation to survivors, repatriation of willing survivors and 
the remains of deceased victims, and official identification and punishment of perpetrators of the 
“comfort system.”126  They also recommended that the Allied powers declassify records 
concerning the “comfort system” and the decision not to prosecute Hirohito at the Tokyo 
Tribunal, and acknowledge their failure to address the crimes committed against comfort 
women.127  At the international level, they recommended that the U.N. ensure Japan provide 
reparations, and request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on Japan’s legal liability for the 
“comfort system.”128  The freedom to issue this diversity of recommendations, and to direct 
some of them to other governments and the U.N., even though these entities were not held 
directly responsible for the crimes in question, again demonstrates the benefits of flexibility 
enjoyed by unofficial people’s tribunals. 
 The preceding explication of the establishment, functioning, and judgment of the 
Women’s Tribunal has highlighted the means by which it took advantage of the adaptability of 
its unofficial status, while adhering to substantive and procedural standards that reinforced its 
legitimacy.  In this way, it sought to maximize influence on survivors, society, and legal and 
political authorities.  Part III will evaluate the effectiveness of these efforts, and the people’s 
tribunal format more generally, to demonstrate that a similarly-structured people’s tribunal on 
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sexual violence in armed conflict could be a valuable compliment to existing official 
mechanisms of accountability. 
III.  Effectiveness of people’s tribunals as unofficial mechanisms of accountability 
 In a letter to Jean-Paul Sartre objecting to the Russell Tribunal, Charles De Gaulle 
wrote, 
I have no need to tell you that justice of any sort, in principle as in 
execution, emanates from the State…. [T]o the extent that some of 
those allied with Lord Russell represent a moral value outside the 
public legal machinery, it does not seem to me that they add to that 
value or to the weight of their arguments by assuming robes 
borrowed for the occasion.129
 
Indeed, it may appear to one accustomed to the formal mechanisms of state-sponsored 
law that a people’s tribunal is, as Chinkin puts it, “no more than a mock trial of little concern to 
serious international lawyers.”130  One might also fear that relegation of an issue such as sexual 
slavery to this type of “extra-legal” forum could undermine efforts to achieve accountability by 
implying that it does not merit serious consideration in an official forum.  Consequently, the 
accuracy of De Gaulle’s observation must be investigated before adopting a people’s tribunal 
format as an unofficial means of achieving accountability for sexual violence in armed conflict. 
A. Potential limits on the effectiveness of people’s tribunals 
 1.  Legitimacy.---People’s tribunals are subject to stronger criticisms of illegitimacy 
than their government-authorized counterparts.  Literally anyone can create a people’s tribunal, 
for any reason, and purport to impose any legal standards---even newly created ones131---using 
any procedures, unfettered by external limitations.  The fact that, historically, people’s 
                                                 
129 Letter of April 19, 1967 from Charles DeGaulle to Jean-Paule Sartre, reprinted in Russell Proceedings, supra 
note 35, at 27, 28. 
130 Chinkin, Tribunal, supra note 28, at 338. 
131 For example, the PPT adjudicates “peoples rights” on the basis of, among other instruments, the Universal 
Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples, issued not by any government or international organization, but by the 
Lelio Basso Foundation.  See supra, note 46. 
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tribunals have been initiated and run by activists in order to raise awareness about an issue or 
change relevant law or policy, raises concern about substantive bias that could undermine the 
legal legitimacy of their judgments.132  Procedural bias can also be a problem: the Women’s 
Tribunal represents a high mark on the spectrum of due process and procedural fairness 
employed by self-proclaimed people’s tribunals.  Finally, people’s tribunals may stray into 
essentially political issues which undermine their legitimacy as mechanisms for legal 
accountability.133
 These criticisms, however, do not suggest that the format itself is illegitimate.  Instead, 
any individual people’s tribunal, if created to address appropriate issues with adequate 
safeguards against bias or unfairness, can avoid being perceived as illegitimate.  Moreover, 
even if greeted with skepticism at the outset, the judgments people’s tribunals issue may result 
in post facto legitimacy on the strength of their evidence and procedures, as Russell Tribunal 
organizers hoped134 and as the detailed and well-supported judgment of the Women’s Tribunal 
demonstrates.135  Further, lack of governmental control, while eliminating a potential check on 
the behavior of people’s tribunals, may actually enhance their legitimacy, insofar as they are 
immune from accusations of imposing victors’ justice and their members are not beholden to 
any political authority.136   
 Certainly, regardless of how fairly they operate or how carefully they investigate the 
                                                 
132 Beigbeder notes that the Russell Tribunal was deemed a “kangaroo court” by critics, and that people’s tribunals 
are often biased against “neo-colonialist” and “imperialist” governments and have consequently ignored abuses 
by nonwestern and noncapitalist regimes.  Beigbeder, supra note 30, at 140, 144.  He has also criticizes the PPT 
for purporting to accept claims only from neutral or broadly representative groups while, in practice, most 
frequently considering complaints from human rights NGOs against their own governments.  Id., at 142. 
133 See, e.g., Id., at 144 (arguing that people’s tribunals have expanded their scope too far beyond humanitarian 
and human rights violation to “battle against an unfair world economic order”). 
134 Sartre, supra note 37, at 4. 
135 See supra, Part II.D. 
136 See Sartre, supra note 37, at 42-43 (arguing by reference to criticisms of Nuremberg Tribunal that Russell 
Tribunal’s “legitimacy derives equally from its total powerlessness, as from its universality”). 
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evidence, people’s tribunals will always lack the institutional legitimacy of government-
authorized courts or tribunals.137  Nevertheless, they can access the institutional legitimacy of 
the language and procedures of the law itself,138 and may also be able to build up their own 
institutional legitimacy through a substantial record of fair and effective proceedings. 
 2.  Unenforceability.---The second key criticism of people’s tribunals is that they are 
ineffective due to their inability to enforce judgments.  Effective steps toward accountability, 
however, can be achieved without the direct enforcement of criminal or civil judgments.  For 
example, a U.S. court’s unenforceable award of $745 million to rape victims from the Bosnian 
conflict has been lauded as an important symbolic judgment, as was the Yamaguchi district 
court’s award of compensation to former “comfort women,” despite the fact that it was 
overturned on appeal.139
 In addition to symbolic effect, people’s tribunal judgments can help limit impunity by 
influencing official political and legal institutions.140  The U.N.’s Special Rapporteur on 
Impunity, for example, recognized that the Russell Tribunal had “filled an institutional lacuna 
[the lack of an international criminal tribunal] in the face of rampant impunity” and listed it 
and other “courts of opinion,” as having made “a particular contribution ” to his work.141  The 
judgment of the Women’s Tribunal was noted in the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
                                                 
137 Even these official mechanisms, of course, may lack institutional legitimacy in some circumstances, due to 
corruption, ineffectiveness, or structural unfairness. 
138 See Chinkin, Tribunal, supra note 28, at 340 (noting Women’s Tribunal combined traditional women’s 
advocacy with “procedural initiatives that have already acquired legitimacy within civil society”); Merry, supra 
note 50, at 21 (describing Hawaiian people’s tribunal as “an effort to harness the power and legitimacy of law in a 
movement of resistance”). 
139 Dixon, supra note 23, at 706-07. 
140 C.f. id., at 713-14 (arguing that “if rape, sexual enslavement and forced pregnancy are consistently pleaded 
and found…to be crimes…which amount per se to torture and enslavement of crimes against humanity” in 
proposed victim compensation tribunal, prosecutors and international criminal tribunals will eventually adopt 
similar interpretations). 
141 Joinet, supra note 17, para. 44. 
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Women’s report on violence in armed conflict,142 and has been deemed to have “undoubtedly 
contributed” to increased international attention to sexual violence in armed conflict and to 
increased prosecutions for rape in the ICTY.143  It may even have influenced the ICTY’s 2001 
finding that sexual slavery constitutes a crime against humanity.144
 Finally, the judgments of people’s tribunals could be enforced if deemed sufficiently 
weighty by official authorities.  The Women’s Tribunal has called for the direct acceptance and 
enforcement of its recommendations by governments and international organizations.145  
Although no such action has been forthcoming, the Women’s Tribunal and other people’s 
tribunals have nevertheless compiled historical records and legal analyses useful not only for 
acknowledgment of victims’ experiences, but also for later prosecution of perpetrators in official 
fora.146
 3.  Lack of state-based authority.---Ultimately, skepticism about legitimacy and 
ineffectiveness derives from people’s tribunals’ lack of official authority.  But, as several 
commentators have argued, “the continued grip of the state on the formal institutions of 
international law” may be waning.147  One of the most important effects of the Women’s 
Tribunal, according to Matsui, is that it “showed that international law is not an order created and 
implemented only by states; the people can and do play an increasingly important role in forcing 
                                                 
142 Coomaraswamy, Armed Conflict, supra note 11, para.96. 
143 Meyer, supra note 54, at 1045; see also Matsui, supra note 73, at 261 (noting that testimony at Women’s 
Tribunal encouraged victims of sexual violence in other armed conflicts, including Yugoslavia, to come forward, 
leading to increased activism about violence against women in armed conflicts). 
144 Meyer, supra note 54, at 1032; see generally Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, No. IT -96-23T (Feb. 22, 
2001). 
145 Women’s Tribunal Charter, supra note 94, Preamble. 
146 See, e.g., John Shamsey, Comment, 80 Years Too Late:  The International Criminal Court and the 20th 
Century’s First Genocide, 11 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 327 (2002) (describing PPT as “invaluable” forum for 
documenting “little known atrocities”).  Chinkin argues that the “exhaustiveness” of the Women’s Tribunal’s 
analysis renders its decision “at least as relevant, if not more weighty, than those carried out by more regularly 
recognized forms of denunciation.”  Chinkin, Tribunal, supra note 28, at 340. 
147 See Chinkin, Tribunal, supra note 28, at 339. 
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states to abide by international law.”148  Not only will this trend diminish the legitimacy and 
enforceability problems discussed above, but the establishment of new people’s tribunals, if 
demonstrated to be legitimate and effective, will also speed this process of increasing 
individuals’ and NGOs’ power to directly ensure accountability under international law. 
 Thus, criticisms arising from people’s tribunals’ lack of official authorization are 
insufficient to undermine their potential utility as means of achieving accountability for sexual 
violence during armed conflict.  Nevertheless, at least in the short term, decisions issued by a 
people’s tribunal will be perceived as less legitimate, and its recommendations will be less 
likely to be implemented, than similar findings and recommendations made by an official 
tribunal.  Especially in light of the inception of the ICC, which has jurisdiction over sexual 
violence for many current and future conflicts, one must question whether the resources of 
advocacy organizations would not be better spent on lobbying for fuller accountability in 
official fora, rather than on adjudication in a people’s tribunal.  The following analysis 
responds in the negative. 
B. Ability to compensate for limitations on off icial  mechanisms of accountability 
The absence of official accountability for sexual violence in many past, present, and 
even future armed conflicts as a result of jurisdictional limitations and lack of political will, 
means that people’s tribunals’ ability to serve as “fallback” mechanisms is of critical 
importance.  Indeed, lack of official accountability was the expressed motivation for the 
creation of the Women’s Tribunal.149  Unless and until official mechanisms of accountability 
address all instances of sexual violence in armed conflict, people’s tribunals will have a role to 
play in holding perpetrators symbolically accountable and providing some measure of justice 
                                                 
148 Matsui, supra note 73, at 271. 
149 Women’s Tribunal Charter, supra note 94, Preamble. 
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to victims.  But in addition, people’s tribunals have the advantage of freedom to formulate 
their mandate and procedures in response to specific circumstances and the special needs of 
victims.  Consequently, even when an instance of sexual violence is addressed in an official 
forum, people’s tribunals can be a useful supplement because of their ability to correct for 
several of the limits on official mechanisms’ effectiveness.150
1.  Gendered interpretation of the law.---First, people’s tribunals can adopt a 
progressive approach to international law that official fora have been reluctant to use.  The 
Women’s Tribunal, for example, not only applied existing legal norms to gender violence by 
determining that sexual slavery is a crime against humanity, but also explicitly recognized and 
rejected gender bias inherent in the peace treaties that ended WWII, and even altered the very 
language of the law by choosing the term “sexual slavery” over “forced prostitution” because 
the latter was considered to hide the “terrible gravity” of the offence, imply volition, and 
stigmatize victims.151  Following this example, a people’s tribunal on sexual violence can 
adopt an interpretation of international legal norms that better reflects gendered realities. Such 
an approach could not only influence legal interpretations adopted by official mechanisms, but 
also, via the “culturally productive role of law,”152 serve as a form of resistance against the 
ongoing impunity of those who commit sexual violence during armed conflict, and the social 
stigma imposed on their victims.153
                                                 
150 See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text. 
151 Oral Judgment, supra note 105, para. 82. 
152 Merry, supra note 50, at 14 (describing how courts and the law, when perceived as legitimate, frame cultural 
understandings of past events). 
153 See id. (noting language of law can be used by social movements as a form of resistance); c.f., Ariane Brunet 
& Stephanie Rousseau, Acknowledging Violations, Struggling Against Impunity:  Women’s Rights, Human 
Rights, in Common Grounds:  Women in War and Armed Conflict Situations 33, 34 (Indai Lourdes Sajor ed., 
1998) (arguing that ending impunity for violations against women requires more than strengthening traditional 
systems for assigning criminal responsibility, but also “greater government, community and individual 
responsibility for addressing the consequences and causes” of such violations); Matsui, supra note 73, at 274 
(advocating use of Women’s Tribunal judgment to reinforce and legitimate understanding of criminal nature of 
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2.  Social connection.---A people’s tribunal can avoid the criticism, sometimes 
lodged against ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, of disjunction from the society it purports to 
serve. Although people’s tribunals have historically been established and run by outside 
intellectual or cultural elites, the Women’s Tribunal demonstrated the power of grassroots 
organizers to create a people’s tribunal that looks in on their own society.154  People’s 
tribunals may thus be able to more effectively “bring justice to the people” and impact on 
local social norms than criminal adjudications by cultural outsiders in a physically distant 
setting.  Such tribunals would also avoid draining the financial contributions made by donor 
countries in the wake of humanitarian disasters brought on by armed conflict. 
3.  Focus on victim recognition.---While both international and national mechanisms 
of formal adjudication are limited by the perpetrator-oriented nature of their inquiry, people’s 
tribunals can shift their focus to victims.  The Women’s Tribunal has been praised for doing 
this by “reject[ing] the overriding imperatives of (re-) order,” and instead placing victims “at 
the centre of a legal discourse of ‘recognition.’”155  Thus, people’s tribunals are a kind of 
hybrid forum,156 capable of providing victims with the therapeutic benefits of telling, and 
receiving acknowledgment of, their experience,157 while also retaining the formalized 
procedures and recognition of criminal liability that many victims find necessary to full 
                                                                                                                                                             
“comfort system” in opposition by efforts by revisionist groups to frame it as a system of voluntary prostitution). 
154 See Chinkin, Tribunal, supra note 28, at 339. 
155 See Dixon, supra note 23, at 708. 
156 See  Chinkin, Tribunal, supra note 28, at 339 (arguing that by both condemning violations and recommending 
reparations, and providing healing to survivors by recognizing abuses committed against them as crimes, 
“people’s tribunal[s] can…combine in a single process elements of both war crimes trials and truth 
commissions”). 
157 See  Dixon, supra note 23, at 709 (citing findings that public recognition is most common reason victims of 
sexual violence in peacetime pursue claims in civil court); Pickup, supra note 79, at 185-87 (arguing that public 
testimony contributes to victims’ mental health by “allow[ing] women to recover the pieces of their personal and 
social identity…shattered” by violation, and describing use of public “naming” by women at the Vienna Tribunal 
as means to overcome violence). 
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justice.158
4.  Procedural flexibility.---Because people’s tribunals are primarily victim-oriented, 
and do not issue directly enforceable penal sentences, they are not limited by the strict 
procedural constraints and evidentiary burden of official criminal tribunals.159  While too 
great a departure from such protections of accuseds’ rights must be avoided, lest the 
legitimacy of the proceedings be undermined, some flexibility---such as permitting 
anonymous testimony, limiting intimidating adversarial cross examination, and adopting 
more lenient rules of admissibility---is an appropriate way to ensure that victims have an 
opportunity, and feel secure enough, to speak out about the full range of harms they have 
experienced. 
C. Value as a supplement to official mechanisms of accountability 
 Beigbeder observed, correctly, that “Peoples’ Tribunals are not a legitimate substitute for 
ad hoc intergovernmental War Crimes Tribunals, nor for a permanent International Criminal 
Court [because t]hey do not have the legitimacy or the powers of a body created by 
governments…they do not create international law, and their judgments are not binding.”160  
Despite the increased involvement of nongovernmental entities in deploying the rule of law, as 
long as the power and legitimacy of international law lies primarily in the hands of States, the 
most effective mechanisms of accountability will be those established by governments. 
Consequently, advocates must continue to press for more and better treatment of sexual violence 
                                                 
158 Mani argues that “[v]ictims want above all a fair procedure where they can be heard by an impartial arbitrator, 
as this allows them to express their loss, and goes further towards restoring their sense of dignity and giving value 
to their suffering.”  Mani, supra note 5, at 90 (citing study indicating that Holocaust victims are satisfied more by 
procedure of gaining justice than by substantive outcome of trials). 
159 See Oral Judgment, supra note 105, para. 70 (noting that due process is an obligation of those acting on legal 
authority, and that the specific process due is determined by the potential prejudice to the accused’s rights); Chinkin, 
Tribunal, supra note 28, at 339 (arguing that people’s tribunals’ limited due process guarantees “should not lessen 
their usefulness”). 
160 Beigbeder, supra note 30, at 144. 
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in armed conflict in official mechanisms of accountability. 
 However, a realistic appreciation of state dominance over the power of law does not 
conflict with the strategic use of people’s tribunals to address inadequate official 
accountability.161  The characteristics discussed above indicate that they can provide a valuable 
supplement to remedy official mechanisms’ demonstrated inability to fully and effectively 
counteract impunity for sexual violence in armed conflict.  Properly constructed and 
implemented, a people’s tribunal can serve as an unofficial, but powerful, legal tool, surpassing 
the Russell Tribunal’s goal of consciousness-raising by providing a real sense of justice to 
victims and influencing societies, international law, and official legal institutions to strengthen 
accountability for sexual violence in armed conflict. 
IV.  The Permanent Women’s Tribunal on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict 
In order to pursue the goal of increased accountability for sexual violence in armed 
conflict, a Permanent Women’s Tribunal for Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (“PWT”) should 
be established.  The PWT should be modeled on the Women’s Tribunal because of the latter’s 
substantive similarity and success in tailoring the people’s tribunal format to address the full 
range of harms that resulted from a specific instance of sexual violence during armed conflict.  
It should build upon this example, expanding its jurisdiction to incorporate crimes of sexual 
violence outside the narrow context of Japan’s military sexual violence during WWII, and 
incorporating those elements of other people’s tribunals and mechanisms of accountability that 
will maximize its legitimacy, enhance its ability to provide effective justice to victims, and 
heighten its influence on official forms of accountability. 
                                                 
161 See Beigbeder, supra note 30, at 145 (arguing that people’s tribunals should “be included as one of 
several tools to combat impunity at the international level”); Chinkin, Tribunal, supra note 28, at 339 
(arguing that people’s tribunals are one in a set of procedural and institutional tools for providing justice 
appropriate to diverse contexts). 
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A. Permanence 
Because of the number, diversity, and continuing incidence of armed conflicts in 
which sexual violence is committed, a single session would be wholly inadequate to provide 
any measure of justice or accountability. On the other hand, it would be financially and 
administratively prohibitive for the PWT to mimic national courts by establishing permanent 
physical facilities and exercising jurisdiction over all properly filed claims. Instead, it should 
imitate the PPT, holding regular sessions, each on a single, or group of related, instances of 
sexual violence in armed conflict.  The subject matter of each session should be determined 
by a permanent administrative committee on the basis of recommendations from individuals 
or organizations, or their own observations.  Permanency would increase the “visibility” of 
the PWT, both among victims of sexual violence who may opt to seek it out as a means of 
achieving justice, and among the legal institutions and broader society that the PWT aims to 
influence.  In addition, it would permit the PWT, over time, to build institutional legitimacy 
through the format, content, and effect of its proceedings. 
B. Jurisdiction 
Noting the limited capacity of people’s tribunals, commentators have recommended that 
they restrict their jurisdiction to “the most serious and extensive crimes against humanity and 
their individual perpetrators.”162  The jurisdiction of the PWT, however, is already constrained 
by its substantive focus on sexual violence occurring in armed conflict.  Within that subset of 
offenses, the PWT should follow the Women’s Tribunal to have jurisdiction over both 
individual and state responsibility for violations of established international criminal, 
humanitarian, and human rights law.  It should not, however, stray into applying national law 
                                                 
162 Beigbeder, supra note 30, at 145; see also Ratner & Abrams, supra note 16, at 301 (arguing that 
mechanisms of accountability for violations of international law must prioritize by ignoring “sporadic or 
otherwise less important violations”). 
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or regional instruments, where its legitimacy might be undermined by a lack of adequate legal 
expertise or respect for state sovereignty.163
Like the Women’s Tribunal, the PWT must observe the principle of nullem crimen sine 
lege, applying only those legal norms binding upon the parties in question.164  Although judges 
should be mindful of the impact that radical interpretation of existing law could have on the 
PWT’s legitimacy, they should nevertheless adopt a gender-aware analysis of the law and 
consider evolving interpretations in other fora as guiding precedent in order to take full 
advantage of the PWT’s ability to correct for official mechanisms’ reticence to a gendered 
approach to sexual violence. 
The PWT must, however, decline to exercise its jurisdiction when a competent official 
tribunal or court, whether national or international, has issued a judgment applying satisfactory 
accountability for the international violations complained of, or has become seized of the matter 
and can be expected to deliver such a judgment.  To do otherwise would risk an inefficient use of 
PWT resources, threaten the PWT’s perceived legitimacy, and undermine its ability to influence 
the tribunal in question on future issues.  However, when the PWT deems that an official forum’s 
treatment of instances of sexual violence has been inadequate, and can convincingly articulate 
the reasons for this conclusion, it should supplement that forum’s judgment with its own, as the 
Women’s Tribunal did with respect to the Tokyo Tribunal’s failure to adequately address sexual 
violence committed by the Japanese military. 
Finally, jurisdictional limitations such as statutes of limitations and amnesties should not 
be observed by the PWT, lest they exacerbate impunity. 
                                                 
163 The application of such laws would, in any case, be duplicative since international law fully prohibits sexual 
violence in armed conflict. 
164 PWT judges should, however, be free to identify gaps in the law and recommend the formulation of 
international instruments to address them.  Such proposals must not, however, provide the basis for a finding of 
individual or state responsibility. 
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C. Power to compensate victims 
One of the most striking features to set the PWT apart from other people’s tribunals 
should be the ability to provide monetary compensation to the victims of sexual violence in 
armed conflict.  Arguing that international criminal accountability fails to fully acknowledge 
and provide justice for women’s experiences of sexual violence, Dixon has proposed the 
creation of an international victims’ compensation tribunal to “connect international 
humanitarian law jurisprudence and compensation in an uninterrupted discourse of 
recognition”165 by providing compensation from an established fund to individual victims of 
sexual violence.  Dixon’s proposed tribunal aims to provide compensation as a form of the 
recognition of violation that victims of sexual violence often need for healing,166 while also 
permitting victims to express their full experiences of violation in a tribunal format.  These 
aims are shared by the PWT.  Furthermore, providing monetary compensation in addition to 
recommending that various forms of reparations be made by official entities would enhance 
the PWT’s ability to fulfill the right to reparation, the third components of accountability 
described by Special Rapporteur Joinet.167
Borrowing from Dixon’s proposal, the PWT should establish a fund based on 
voluntary contributions,168 from which it would pay compensation to victims identified in its 
proceedings on “a needs basis rather than a harm basis, with the causative link between the 
harm of criminal victimization and need being treated as a matter of statutory 
                                                 
165 Dixon, supra note 23, at 711. 
166 See id., at 709 (discussing victims’ need for recognition); see also Mani, supra note 5, at 113-14 (describing 
reparations, including monetary compensation, as a key means of informal justice); Brunet & Rousseau, supra 
note 152, at 52 (emphasizing importance of meeting victims’ needs via reparations). 
167 See supra note 17. 
168 Although the voluntarily-funded Asian Women’s Fund met with criticism from victims’ groups, voluntary 
funding of PWT compensation should be received more positively, since it does not purport to eliminate states’ 
responsibilities to, themselves, accept legal liability and provide reparations. 
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presumption.”169  Although funding such a mechanism would be a daunting task, and would 
render administration of the PWT more complex, it would also greatly enhance th ePWT’s 
ability to provide practical assistance to victims suffering from the long-term consequences 
of sexual violence, to encourage additional victims of sexual violence to speak out in social 
and legal fora,170 and to reinforce its legitimacy by directly “enforcing” at least one 
component of its rulings. 
D. Administration 
In addition to its structural framework, the PWT must be administered in a manner that 
will maximize its credibility and impact.  Thus, in order to strengthen the connection between 
PWT’s proceedings and the societies for which they aim to provide justice, efforts should be 
made to hold sessions in the locality where the violations in question occurred or where the 
victims are located,171 and to include local individuals and NGOs as active participants in 
organizing and operating each session.  Grassroots involvement of this nature will also help 
eliminate any lingering concerns about imposition of elitist or culturally inappropriate legal 
interpretations.172  In addition, the PWT should provide witnesses with adequate psychological 
and social support services to ensure their security when giving testimony about their 
experiences, which might expose them to stigma, retribution, or psychological re-
                                                 
169 Dixon ,  supra note 23, at 716.  Need-based compensation, Dixon argues, permits a tribunal to recognize not 
only the direct harms cased by sexual violence, such as physical or psychological suffering, but also the 
secondary harms, such as divorce and social stigma, without introducing patriarchal notions of loss of honor or 
disgrace into the elements of criminal violation.  Id. ,  at 716-17. 
170 See id . ,  at 712. 
171 C.f. Askin, Quest, supra note 4, at 520-21 (advocating holding hybrid international/national war crimes 
tribunals in the locality where violations occurred in order to impact positively on the nation’s judicial system 
and increase awareness within society of the judicial redress being sought). 
172 C.f. Dixon, supra note 23, at 713 (arguing that permitting women to initiate their own claims for recognition of 
sexual violation, based on their own culturally-specific experience, will eliminate the “cultural-relativist 
‘cringe’”). 
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traumatization.173
Special Rapporteur Joinet has cautioned that independence and impartiality are 
foundational principles that commissions inquiring into human rights abuses “must honour or 
lose credibility.”174  Accordingly, these criteria should also be met by the PWT.  To that end, 
measures to ensure the independence and objectivity of PWT judges, similar to those imposed 
by the Women’s Tribunal, should be implemented.  A balance of legal expertise and opinion, 
gender, and national origin on the judging panel will also help ensure independence,175 as will 
a willingness to consider violations committed by all parties to a conflict.  Finally, the PWT 
must ensure transparency about the affiliations of its participants, and sources of its 
funding.176
E. Procedure 
Following the example of the Women’s Tribunal, the PWT should maintain appropriate 
procedural safeguards to ensure legitimacy.  Due process for accused parties, however, must be 
balanced against the needs of victims.177  Because the PWT lacks the authority to enforce penal 
or other sanctions, and is primarily victim-oriented, it should be flexible in its procedures when 
necessary to fully meet the needs of victims.178  It should be willing, for example, to hear oral 
testimony from all victims who wish to speak publicly, regardless of time constraints, to accept 
anonymous or confidential testimony from victims, and to utilize available media, such as 
                                                 
173 C.f. id., para. 22. 
174 Joinet, supra note 17, paras. 20-21. 
175 See id., para. 22 (“A wide range of opinions among commission members also makes for independence.”); 
Sartre, supra note 37, at 44 (noting that some Russell Tribunal judges were from nation whose actions were 
under scrutiny, enhancing the appearance of impartiality). 
176 C.f. Joinet, supra note 17, Annex II, Principle 10(a) (requiring commission of inquiry to have “transparent 
funding to keep them from coming under suspicion”). 
177 Chinkin, International Law ,  supra note 4, at 339. 
178 See Brunet & Rousseau, supra note 152, at 50 (noting difficulty of protecting victims and witnesses while also 
securing due process rights of accused). 
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videoconferencing, to facilitate testimony by victims who are unable to attend a PWT session.179  
At a minimum, however, the safeguards identified by Special Rapporteur Joinet to protect 
persons implicated in the investigations of extrajudicial commissions of inquiry should provide 
the baseline of procedural fairness granted those accused before the PWT.  Consequently, states 
and individuals should be notified of charges against them and given an opportunity to respond 
in writing or in person, and the PWT must make efforts to corroborate accusations of sexual 
violence, where possible, from multiple sources.180
The evidentiary requirements observed by the PWT should be similarly flexible, since 
the availability of evidence will vary significantly from conflict to conflict. While the elements 
of each offense should remain fixed, the evidentiary burden and standards of admissibility can 
be adapted to fit each specific context.  Although findings such as the Women’s Tribunal’s, 
made “beyond a reasonable doubt,” will be the most satisfying to victims and likely to 
encourage accountability in official mechanisms, a lower burden, such as a preponderance of the 
evidence, may be adequate for determining whether an individual is entitled to compensation for 
violations committed against her.181  PWT judges can assure continued credibility of their 
judgments in spite of varying standards of proof by clearly articulating the standard used in each 
case, explaining the reasons for doing so, and evaluating the implications thereof for future 
reliance on their conclusions by official fora. 
F. Publicity 
As the Women’s Tribunal recognized, broad and strategic publication of judgments in 
                                                 
179 See Dixon, supra note 23, at 714, 715 (advocating similar means of procedural flexibility of victims’ 
compensation tribunal). 
180 See Joinet, supra note 17, at Annex II, Principle 8. 
181 Dixon, supra note 23, 711. 
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necessary to maximize a tribunal’s impact on official mechanisms of accountability.182  Vigorous 
publication in popular media, especially in the localities where violations occurred, is necessary 
to ensure that the PWT impacts positively on social understandings of sexual violence.  It must, 
however, be explicitly stated in each judgment that the PWT does not purport to be a substitute 
for official mechanisms of accountability.  This is necessary to ensure the victims do not 
misconstrue the enforceability of the PWT’s decisions, and to ensure that it serves to encourage, 
rather than excuse, official mechanisms’ responsibility to adequately address violations of 
international law arising from sexual violence in armed conflict.  In addition to broadcast 
publication, judgments should be published directly to States responsible for violations or for 
failing to hold violators accountable, to relevant international organizations such as the U.N. 
Commission for Human Rights, and to legal or academic journals, in order to encourage the 
recognition of violations and implementation of the PWT’s recommendations in official 
mechanisms of accountability, and the broader interpretation and enforcement of gender-based 
crimes in international law. 
G. Cooperation with off icial  mechanisms of accountability 
Finally, the PWT should work with the ICC to take advantage of Article 15(2) of the 
ICC Statute, which permits the ICC Prosecutor to initiate an investigation based on 
information from NGO and other reliable sources.  Via this provision, the PWT could help 
remedy the ICC’s limited capacity by functioning as a filter, reviewing multiple instances of 
sexual violence in armed conflict and recommending to the ICC those most amenable to 
adjudication and most likely to have a strong impact against impunity.  It could also make its 
legal analysis available to the ICC and its Prosecutors via Article 44(4) of the ICC Statute, 
                                                 
182 Women’s Tribunal Charter, supra note 94, Art. 14(4); see also Joinet, supra note 17, para. 24 (arguing that 
commission of inquiry reports “should be published as widely as possible”). 
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which permits them to make use of NGOs’ expertise.  Thus, the potential exists not only for 
PWT judgments to be used by advocates in lobbying for improved accountability in official 
fora, but also for the PWT to work with this most promising of the official mechanisms of 
accountability to enhance the ICC’s ability to ensure accountability for sexual violence in 
armed conflict.  Similarly, opportunities for cooperation with national fora, which may exist 
under some States’ domestic law, should also be utilized by the PWT. 
V. Conclusion 
Although they have existed and proliferated since the late 1960s, people’s tribunals 
have been largely ignored by the international legal community because of their unofficial, 
and consequently unorthodox, nature.  Since the dawn of international law, States have 
traditionally been its subjects, arbiters, and enforcers.  But as globalization continues to bring 
individuals and social movements closer together across the world, international law is 
gradually being directed toward the individual rather than the nation-state, and the people’s 
tribunal stands poised to gain increasing legitimacy and influence on global law and society. 
To overlook the utility of the people’s tribunal format because it lacks official 
authorization would be a cynical denial of the historic power of individuals to influence and 
enforce the rule of law in the face of government resistance, reluctance, or apathy.  The 
foregoing analysis demonstrates that people’s tribunals can serve as an effective mechanism 
of accountability, not only because they can maintain adequate legitimacy to serve as a last 
resort where official mechanisms are lacking, but also because they possess distinct and 
unique advantages that enable their use in tandem, and even in cooperation, with established 
offical legal institutions. 
The structure and function of the PWT laid out above are, of course, preliminary, and 
Terrell 44 
it cannot be denied that significant obstacles would be faced in implementing its design.  
Nevertheless, the rampant commission of sexual atrocities against women in armed conflicts 
across centuries and continents demonstrates that enhanced accountability is desperately 
needed.  The proposed PWT is one tool that women have the power to create today in order to 
begin meeting that need, with the ultimate goal of providing, and encouraging official 
mechanisms to provide, full, legitimate, and enforced accountability to eradicate the 
devastating effects of sexual violence in armed conflict. 
